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Normally we experience the physical body
as our own, except in rare conditions
and transitory illusions. Cognitive neuro-
scientists, philosophers, and psychologists
call this feeling bodily self-consciousness
(Damasio, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Legrand,
2006; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Ferri
et al., 2011, 2012). The Rubber Hand
Illusion is though to operationalize on
bodily self-consciousness (David et al.,
2013, for a different view). By using this
illusion it has been demostrated that bod-
ily self-consciousness is highly variable
across healthy individuals (Haans et al.,
2012). This means that the susceptibility to
the illusion largely varies across individu-
als. The origin of such variability remains
largely unknown. In this opinion paper,
I propose the possibility that it can be
traced, in part, to the individual’s immune
system ability to differentiate the self from
nonself. In particular, I suggest a biological
substrate for such dependency.
The intriguing idea of a link between
the Bodily Self and the Immune Self
was proposed by Antonio Damasio more
than 10 years ago (Damasio, 2003). Here
the Bodily Self is defined as a non-
propositional representation of intero-
exteroceptive information (Haggard et al.,
2003; Pacherie, 2008); and the Immune
Self is defined as whatever the immune sys-
tem recognize as belonging to the hosting
body (Nossal, 2001). Damasio’s fascinat-
ing suggestion remains largely at the theo-
retical level, with little empirical support.
However, recently things are changing.
Barnsley and colleagues found that during
the Rubber Hand Illusion the immune sys-
tem treats the concealed hand as a foreign
body part, as demonstrated by increases
histamine reactivity (Barnsley et al., 2011).
Thus, Barnsley et al’s data suggest a biolog-
ical link between bodily self-consciousness
and the immune system.
The immune system is a set of
molecules, proteins and processes that
protects against disease. To do that, the
immune system must be able to distin-
guish the host’s own cells from virus and
bacteria. In principle the immune sys-
tem has the potentiality to destroy the
host (i.e., the Self) and the pathogens
(i.e., the nonself). When the immune sys-
tem appropriately regulates by engaging
in biodestructive activity of a pathogen,
then that pathogen is considered as part
of the “nonself,” while tolerance towards
the healthy tissue of the host is consid-
ered part of the “self.” However, when
biodestructive activity is inappropriately
regulated, autoimmunity might occur.
Autoimmunity is indeed the error of the
immune system in recognizing its own
cells as nonself. Prominent examples
include Celiac disease, diabetes mellitus
type 1, systemic lupus erythematosus,
Hashimoto’s thyroiditis, Graves’ disease,
rheumatoid arthritis, and multiple scle-
rosis. The presence of an autoimmune
disease is signaled by the appearance
of autoantibodies in the patient blood.
Among immunologists, different mech-
anisms have been proposed to explain
the ability of the immune system to
differentiate pathogens from the host,
including altered self (Houghton, 1994),
danger theory (Matzinger, 2002) and dis-
continuity theory (Pradeu et al., 2013).
However, a detailed review of such pro-
posals is far from the aim of the present
paper.
How it is possible to explain an empir-
ical link between the Bodily Self and the
Immune Self? One possibility is to look at
the basic mechanisms driving the Bodily
Self and to look whether such mechanisms
are sensitive to the status of the immune
system.
According to some authors, the founda-
tion of the self lies in the brain networks
representing the body (Damasio, 2003;
Gallagher, 2005; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009) and integrating interoceptive and
exteroceptive inputs (Tsakiris et al., 2011).
In the case of the rubber hand illu-
sion, multisensory integration between
vision and touch “changes the phenome-
nal status of the rubber hand from inan-
imate object to part of one’s own body”
(Ehrsson, 2012). Since multisensory bod-
ily inputs are continuous, whereas exter-
nal objects of perception are transient
and therefore not continuous, these mul-
tisensory bodily inputs have been pro-
posed as the basis for the Bodily Self
(Arzy et al., 2006; Aspell et al., 2009;
Ionta et al., 2011a,b, 2014; Limanowski
and Blankenburg, 2013). According to
this view, when multisensory bodily sig-
nals (i.e., visual and spatio-temporal sig-
nals) received from a body part match,
a sense of ownership then arises for
that body part (Ehrsson, 2012). Such
constitutive role of multisensory integra-
tion in bodily self-consciousness might
bridge the gap between the Bodily Self
and the Immune Self. Indeed, despite
its crucial role, multisensory integration
is not an innate ability. Neurons with
multisensory capability in the superior
colliculus (SC) are ineffective in combin-
ing cross-modal stimuli at early stages
of life (Wallace and Stein, 1997, 2001,
2007). They require postnatal maturation
to acquire this capability.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 138 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Costantini Bodily self and immune self
Supporting this view is the finding that
manipulating the spatio-temporal features
of cross-modal stimuli has a strong impact
on the normal development of multisen-
sory neurons (Wallace et al., 2004). That is,
changing the natural statistics of the envi-
ronment (Chandrasekaran et al., 2009),
changes the way neurons encode future
stimuli (Wallace and Stein, 2007). This
data support the idea that axon pruning
and neural plasticity are necessary condi-
tions for the maturation of multisensory
neurons.
Strikingly, neural plasticity in the SC
and other brain structures is deeply
intertwined with the immune system
via substances called cytokines, with the
interleukins being prominent examples
(Boulanger, 2009; Yirmiya and Goshen,
2011). These cells are used by the immune
system to orchestrate the production of
antibody and memory cell formation. The
name interleukins mirrors their role in
communication between leukocytes.
Interestingly, the prolonged exposure
to pro-inflammatory cytokines causes
premature stabilization of developing
synapses within the tectum (i.e., the SC
in mammals). Therefore, this prevents
normal synaptic refinement and elimi-
nation that occurs during development.
Indeed, during development, the optic
tectum undergoes a substantial amount
of modification, both locally (e.g., within
the tectum itself) and in its projection to
the retina (Lee et al., 2010). A consider-
able amount of this modification involves
consolidation and stabilization of some
synapses, and weakening and elimination
of others. This evidence is in line with
the protracted period of postnatal matu-
ration required by multisensory neurons
to develop the ability of combining cross-
modal stimuli (Stein et al., 1973; Wallace
and Stein, 1997, 2001). Other evidence
of the link between neural plasticity and
immune molecules comes from studies
on long-term potentiation (LTP). In 1998,
Schneider et al. demonstrated that the
pro-inflammatory cytokine IL-1 in the
hippocampus plays a pivotal role in long
term potentiation as well as in maintaining
it. The dose-dependent effect of IL-1 on
memory and LTP is also demonstrated
by the detrimental effect of intracere-
broventricular administration of IL-1 on
the acquisition of spatial memories after
spatial water maze training (Oitzl et al.,
1993). In the same vein, chronic exposure
to IL-1 produces important deficit in spa-
tial memory, as measured by means of the
water maze paradigm, as well as dimin-
ished long-term contextual fear memory
(Moore et al., 2009; Hein et al., 2010).
Other cytokines, genes, and proteins play
a role in the communication between the
brain and the immune system (Boulanger
and Shatz, 2004; Boulanger, 2009). For
instance, several studies showed a negative
effect of elevated IL-6 levels on synaptic
plasticity (Li et al., 1997).
In summary, a basic sense of Self in
housed in the brain structures represent-
ing the body (Legrand, 2006; Blanke,
2012). Such representations depend upon
multisensory bodily signals. To develop
the ability to integrate bodily signals axon
pruning, neurogenesis and synaptic plas-
ticity are mandatory processes (Stein et al.,
1973). These processes, in turn, are deeply
intertwined with the immune system
(Boulanger, 2009; Yirmiya and Goshen,
2011). From this perspective, the Bodily
Self and the Immune Self have a common
biological background. I am not propos-
ing a new theory of the Self, but I am
proposing an extension to the theoretical
framework that is being developed to bet-
ter understand the Self. The immune sys-
tem consists of many proteins, molecules
and processes. Hence, my proposal is spec-
ulative and not exhaustive. Future empiric
studies should be conducted to test this
proposal.
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